



Unjust enrichment claims require us to prove at a minimum that the defendant is enriched, enriched at the expense of the claimant and there is some cause of action, often referred to as an unjust factor. Peter Birks, before his conversion to a legal grounds approach, coined the phrase “defendant-sided unjust factors”.​[1]​ The two claims with which we are concerned in this paper are duress and undue influence. Both are defendant-sided and so called because of the need for the defendant to have done something, although the defendant may in fact be completely innocent in the sense of having no intention to take advantage of the claimant. This insistence that the defendant must have done something has, however, led some to argue incorrectly that these are wrongs for which the claimant ought to recover damages.​[2]​ 

Often these claims – and mistake claims – are justified on the basis of the party’s vitiated intention. Birks for instance described both mistake and the defendant-sided factors as being based on vitiated intention, thus grouping them together.​[3]​ In the past I have relied on Michael Bratman’s influential views on the philosophy of action and intention in an effort to model the structure of both the failure of consideration claim and the mistake claim in terms of how the claimant’s intentional agency is affected. Essentially I argued that both claims are dependent on an unfulfilled condition to either a collective intention (failure of consideration) or individual intention (mistake).​[4]​  The model I developed is consistent with the view, adopted both here and in the earlier essay, that the reason why we give relief in such cases is that we would otherwise – in Aruna Nair’s language - not be respecting the payor as a “self-legislating actor” following his own “rationally determined norms”.​[5]​ One of those norms is that I pay what I owe, but by leaving the mistaken payment for instance in the payee’s hands the law leaves me in effect in the position of paying what I do not owe. My intention does not cover the case as it actually turned out to be. 

This paper models , on the basis of Bratman’s theory, how duress and undue influence as vitiating factors in contract and unjust enrichment structurally affect the structure of the claimant’s intentional agency. Peter Birks, before his conversion to a legal grounds approach, coined the phrase “defendant-sided unjust factors” to refer to these actions,​[6]​ because the defendant needs to do something to for example influence the claimant– unlike in mistake cases where he need not have done anything. Michael Bratman has built up a philosophical theory of how intention works and how we as agents go about planning what we do and why over the course of 30 years, and it has proven both prominent and highly influential in the philosophy of action. This paper therefore seeks to model the effect of duress and undue influence on the basis of his theory. ThateHis theory is conceptual and analytic rather than justificatory so we assume rather than prove that there is a convincing theoretical rationale for reversing a transaction where our autonomous agency is impaired. 

In a previous paper, to which this is intended to be a companion, I relied on Michael Bratman’s views in an effort to model the structure of both the failure of consideration claim and the mistake claim in terms of how the claimant’s intentional agency is affected. These claims might be referred to as “claimant-sided” because for example to recover a mistaken payment requires nothing to be proven about the defendant except that he was the payee. Essentially I argued that both claims are dependent on an unfulfilled condition to either a collective intention (failure of consideration) or individual intention (mistake).​[7]​  The model I developed is consistent with the view, adopted both here and in the earlier essay, that the reason why we give relief in such cases is that we would otherwise – in Aruna Nair’s language - not be respecting the payor as a “self-legislating actor” following his own “rationally determined norms”.​[8]​ One of those norms is that I pay what I owe, but by leaving the mistaken payment for instance in the payee’s hands the law leaves me in effect in the position of paying what I do not owe. My intention does not cover the case as it actually turned out to be. In this paper I claim that the defendant-sided unjust factors cause the payor not to follow his own rationally determined norms, because he is acting, as we see, “in the grip of a norm;” there were problems in the way in which the payor decides on what to do which were caused by the defendant’s actions. 
Nonetheless Bratman’s theory allows us to appreciate that the law of unjust enrichment contains two different types of claim. In both cases the claimant is not following “his rationally determined norms”; while in mistake cases that is because of an unfulfilled condition on his intention, in defendant-sided cases it is because of problems in setting those norms. On a view which maintains​[9]​ that there be only one type of claim in a category this is impossible, but on a more realistic pluralistic account this does not matter.​[10]​ There are real doctrinal consequences to more fully understanding the structure of the defendant-sided claim. One is the availability of change of position. That defence allows the defendant say that he relied on his right to keep the money by – usually – spending it and therefore disenriching himself. By appreciating the need for the defendant to have done something, we can see that the defendant is disabled in many cases from relying on his receipt of the assets because of the way in which he consciously inveigled himself into the claimant’s decision-making, but without needing to resort to wrongdoing as an explanation. That said, if the defendant is innocent so for example there is no active use of his influence over the claimant, the defence remains available.​[11]​ 

InIn the first part we examine the different claims in doctrinal terms. We adopt a doctrinal explanation of the claims in terms of illegitimate pressure and lack of practical choice in the case of duress, and abuse of deferential trust in the case of undue influence. In neither action is wrongdoing required. The lack of clarity, particularly with respect to whether undue influence is based on a fiduciary trust rationale looking at the quality of the claimant’s consent or pure wrongful exploitation of power, justifies an extended discussion. This is important because if undue influence, for instance, is better justified as wrongdoing, the model developed in the second half of the paper is unhelpful. That model examines how the claimant’s agency is affected. If, however, undue influence is premised on wrongdoing the claimant’s agency is not the focus of the action. The second part models the claims’ operation, drawing on the philosophy of action and the metaphysics of agency and gets us past old debates about whether we “really” consent. When after all I pay under pressure of a threat to kill, it is common to say that I really do consent. Both causes of action can be conceptually modelled in terms of problems in end-setting by the claimant; the claimant acts in the grip of a norm. He acts in other words on the basis of attenuated reasoning about what to do, which does not, because of the defendant’s actions, take into account all the appropriate reasons for action.  What makes the two actions different is the differing way in which the defendant’s actions cause this to occur.

1.	Two Defendant-Sided Claims 











Birks and Chin argue that undue influence is concerned with impaired consent and not what they call “wicked exploitation”.​[14]​ This dichotomy is misleading; the defendant-sided cases such as undue influence are concerned with both.  Another preliminary point is thatM many undue influence cases also involve three parties, either because A has unduly influenced B to make a transfer or provide a benefit to C or because B transfers to A, who then transfers to C.​[15]​ Those cases are very frequent and often involve a family member – usually the husband or male partner – influencingputting “pressure” on another family member who subsequently wishes to resist enforcement of a mortgage or guarantee by the third party bank. They concern two problems;  – firstly what counts as undue influence, but secondly how C is affected by A’s exercise of his influence, and what degree of notice C must have of that influence to be precluded from enforcing his rights. We are not concerned with that second question of how C might be affected and for what reason.such cases specifically here While some notice is required so as to make sure that That is important in that it affects whether banks might beare not unduly affected by the dynamics of the relationship between A and B and thereby  potentially deterred from lending in some cases, itbut says nothing about the nature of undue influencee as between A and B, which is the primary focus of the article. 





(I)	Undue Influence Basics 

Actual undue influence requires the complainant to prove that the defendant unduly exercised his influence. Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner talked of “unfair and improper conduct ... coercion... cheating, and generally, though not always, some personal advantage obtained.”​[18]​ Historically and by contrast the rationale in presumed undue influence cases was the protection of fiduciary relationships.​[19]​ There are, in the modern day, two factors which must be proven to raise the presumption; Lord Nicholls said in RBS v Etridge (no 2)​[20]​ that the complainant must have reposed trust and confidence in the other party and the transaction must be not readily explicable by the parties’ relationship.​[21]​ The “not readily explicable” criterion replaces the former criterion that the transaction be of manifest disadvantage to the claimant, a criterion which had already been removed prior to Etridge in actual undue influence cases.​[22]​ 

Etridge also led to doubt being cast on the typology of presumed undue influence. BCCI v Aboody​[23]​ had previously provided a list of relationships presumed to generate a capacity to influence – class 2A cases. The court in that case also held that the claimant might prove that the capacity to influence existed outside those cases – class 2B cases. Class 2A cases include for example doctor-patient,​[24]​ parent-child,​[25]​ and solicitor-client.​[26]​ Class 1 cases were cases of actual undue influence. The list of relationships in class 2A, as Lord Chelmsford said in Tate v Williamson,​[27]​ is not closed. In Etridge Lord Hobhouse said that the class 2B presumption was not a useful forensic tool;​[28]​ Lord Scott argued that while 2A was useful in identifying particular relationships where the presumption of an ability to influence arose, 2B does no more than recognise that evidence of an ability to influence or dominate shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show he did not exercise influence.​[29]​ The shift in the burden of proof remains important though. As Mujih explains,​[30]​ 2A and 2B cases as Lord Scott describes them are logically distinct. In that sense the distinction remains, and indeed the House provided no decisive authority for the abandonment of the 2A/2B distinction;​[31]​ it is the distinction between class 1 and 2B that will blur. Essentially in class 1 the claimant must prove the abuse of a relationship. In class 2B he proves a propensity to influence and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show it was not exercised. Class 2A cases involve an additional presumption of something proven in 2B cases, that being the presence of a capacity to influence.​[32]​ Lord Nicholls put it​[33]​ that the law adopts a protective attitude towards certain types of relationship and the complainant need not therefore prove that he actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party. Lord Nicholls denied that the 2A presumption was rebuttable.​[34]​ 

 The need for the transaction to be “not readily explicable” is explained as raising a presumption that the influence was exercised; it would be absurd if every gift by a child to a parent were deemed suspect unless proven otherwise.​[35]​ However, even substantively fair transactions should be able to be rescinded for undue influence if it emerges from the scope of the party’s influence.​[36]​ Typically, however, as Lord Nicholls said, presumed undue influence cases occur when one party puts trust in another to look after his interests and the latter in fact prefers his own interests, ​[37]​ which will usually lead to an unfair outcome.​[38]​ 


For Chen-Wishart it is all to do with inferences from the evidence.​[39]​ This is strengthened by the comments of Lord Scott in the decision of Li Sau Ying v Bank of China.​[40]​ For him, the message from Etridge was that concentration on the presumption was liable to send parties astray and distract from “whether the evidence justifies a conclusion that the impugned transaction was procured by undue influence.” In all cases, Chen-Wishart argues, the court will look at the motivation of the claimant, the relationship between the parties and whether there was independent advice.​[41]​ The importance of such advice is that it may indicate that influence was not exercised. Chen-Wishart therefore holds clearly to the relational justification for undue influence. What is important is that the defendant has used the relationship improperly to obtain something he should not have. The relationship helps distinguish undue influence from unconscionability, where the defendant takes advantage of a special disability vis-à-vis himself of the claimant, but where the language of morally reprehensible behaviour and predation would make it a wrong.​[42]​ It is to this we now turn.


(II)	Distinction from Unconscionable Dealing 

The important question to ask in determining the rationale for undue influence is whether it is concerned with the claimant’s consent or the defendant’s conduct. For Enonchong it is about wrongdoing;​[43]​ for Birks and Chin it is about impairment of consent. The cases are also split. In Hammond v Osborn​[44]​ it was said the defendant need not have been at fault. Osborn helped an increasingly frail Hammond out over eighteen months. He claimed that to thank him, Hammond had said to sell £300,000 worth of investments and keep the proceeds. That left Hammond with a large tax bill and too little to live on, so the presumption of undue influence arose.​[45]​ In RBS v Chandra,​[46]​ however, fault does appear to have been needed. Patten LJ talks of unconscionability, for the defendant to have notice of the conduct and that the cases were “replete with references to abuse of trust, exploitation and domination of the injured party. All of these characterise some conscious act of wrong-doing on the fiduciary's part.”​[47]​  


Chen-Wishart has rightly argued that the debate on undue influence has ossified into a bipolar one, but that any one-dimensional view of undue influence must fail.​[48]​ She suggests that both sides of the argument are in one way or another concerned with the quality of the complainant’s consent and that there are hints of this in the case law. In Contractors Bonding v Snee​[49]​ Richardson J said undue influence “is directed at conduct within a relationship which justifies the conclusion that the disposition or agreement was not the result of a free exercise of the disponer's will. The doctrine is founded on the principle that equity will protect the party who is subject to the influence of another from victimisation.”​[50]​ 

Both Chen-Wishart and Bigwood​[51]​ correctly find the key in fiduciary law, and references to the fiduciary-like nature of liability can be found in some of the wrongdoing cases like Chandra. Confusion abounds, however, and in part this is because of the current debate as to the shape of fiduciary liability. Leaving modern debate as to the nature of fiduciary liability to one side, it is nowadays unusual in England to equate relationships of influence with fiduciary relationships. In line with this Enonchong​[52]​ argues that to place the rationale here is to misunderstand the law, saying they are quite different ideas and relationships. For Enonchong it demonstrates confusion with the doctrine of abuse of confidence.​[53]​ That doctrine states that in the absence of competent independent advice, a transaction between a principal and fiduciary cannot be upheld, unless the latter has disclosed all relevant information and that the transaction was a fair one.​[54]​ However, as Enonchong describes it, it seems an amalgam of the fair dealing principle and duty-duty or client-client​[55]​ conflicts; it is doubtful that a stand-alone doctrine can be found separate from these well recognised fiduciary doctrines; certainly it is not much discussed in the literature under this label. In any case abuse of confidence is not inconsistent with the proposition that the rationales of fiduciary relations and relations of influence – although different – are branches of the same underlying concern. 

In Flannigan’s view fiduciary duties are imposed to maintain the integrity of trusting relationships.​[56]​ He and others, such as Bigwood, who draw on this fiduciary rationale distinguish between vigilant trust and deferential trust. The distinction fits well. Vigilant trust refers to the fact that the law keeps watch to ensure that the management of financial affairs for example by the fiduciary is done properly and removes incentives to behave wrongly. Deferential trust refers to cases where the complainant defers in some way to the judgment of the defendant rather than making his own mind up.​[57]​ For Chen-Wishart what happens – chiming well with the basic idea of deferential trust - is that the complainant lets her guard down and trusts the other to look after her interests,​[58]​ and this affects the quality of her consent. For example in Thompson v Foy​[59]​ it was said that the critical question was whether the influence had affected the complainant’s free volition, and in Drew v Daniel whether the donor’s will was the “offspring of someone else’s volition” or where the party’s will was overborne.​[60]​ This is reminiscent of what Bratman calls “acting in the grip of a norm”​[61]​ to which we will have recourse in the next part. None of this, however, implies wrongdoing necessarily, however. In Allcard v Skinner the influence that the Mother Superior had over the nuns was deemed problematic and easily abused, but nobody ever suggested that she acted wrongfully. The single overriding idea therefore is that the integrity of trusting relationships be maintained.​[62]​ The relationship carries with it the potential for intentionally or otherwise diverting assets,​[63]​ or as Flannigan calls it, the potential for abusing a limited access arrangement.​[64]​ 

Bigwood, however, argues that RBS v Etridge (no 2) in fact eviscerated the fiduciary rationale and began a process of integration with other exculpatory factors,​[65]​ such that it is now difficult to distinguish them. For Bigwood the extension of undue influence in Etridge to wider arm’s length power-vulnerability cases starts a process – illegitimate in his view - of merger with unconscionable bargains doctrine.​[66]​ The Privy Council suggested in AG v R that undue influence is based on unfair exploitation of a relationship,​[67]​ which tends to support a link with unconscionability, particularly when read in conjunction with the remark that if the transaction did not give rise to an inference that it had been unfairly obtained by a party able to exercise influence it could not be unconscionable.​[68]​ Maddaugh and McCamus though argue the opposite, pointing to the caseEtridge as the major support for their claim of a fiduciary link,​[69]​ and it is worth noting that the link with abuse of confidence or other fiduciary doctrines made in Etridge rather supports this. The differences in academic opinion are reflected in Etridge itself. Lord Nicholls talks of the need for the defendant to have preferred his own interests to those of the complainant,​[70]​ a very fiduciary way of putting the matter. He talked of abuse of confidence and of relationships of trust and confidence,​[71]​ the latter again a very fiduciary way of putting things, and which remains the most commonly applied test for the presence of a relationship of influence. Lord Hobhouse even talks of “fiduciary or analogous” relationships.​[72]​ Despite all this “fiduciary-like” or “fiduciary-lite” talk, Lord Nicholls argues – with respect wrongly - that there is no single touchstone of liability to undue influence.​[73]​ Lord Nicholls’ explanation of undue influence veers between mutually exclusive justifications in that he extends the scope of relational undue influence to include the power-vulnerability and wrongful exploitation cases,​[74]​ which cannot be explained in the same way. Such cases are better dealt with by the doctrine of unconscionable bargains – at least as it is understood in the Antipodes.​[75]​ 







There are three types of duress; duress to the person, where threats are made against the claimant or members of his family; duress to goods where the threat is to damage property and economic duress.​[86]​ The crux of duress lies in one party making a threat​[87]​ inducing another with no practical alternative to manifest contractual assent.​[88]​ The essential structural feature is that there is both a proposal prong and a choice prong. We take these in turn.  


(I)	Proposal Prong: Illegitimacy 

In economic duress the need for illegitimate pressure was set outconfirmed by The Universe Sentinel.​[89]​ This was subsequently confirmed by AG v R where the Privy Council decided the illegitimacy of the pressure wasof one of two elements of duress,.​[90]​ the other being compulsion of the will. There are two aspects of this prong – first the nature of the pressure and secondly the nature of the demand it supports. On the first it is clear that threats to do something illegal are always illegitimate. Threats to act lawfully may also be;, which militates against a wrongdoing interpretation of duress, although blackmail for instance does involves a threat to do a lawful thing. It is worth mentioning There arein this context  also House of Lords’ decisions, which demonstrate that tortious wrongdoing is not necessary for there to be duress – although it may be present in many cases.​[91]​ The controversy lies around threats to break a contract.​[92]​ McKendrick and Bigwood say correctly that a threat to break a contract is always illegitimate, but others suggest that it must be in bad faith,​[93]​ or that a threat made in the belief that it was commercially reasonable is not illegitimate.​[94]​ 


The question, Burrows argues, is whether the court should protect the old or the renegotiated bargain.​[95]​ Spark argues that there is only one case that specifically holds that a threatened breach of contract is not necessarily illegitimate: DSND Subsea Ltd v PGS Offshore Technology.​[96]​ PGS was awarded a contract to help develop an oil field. Subsea work was sub-contracted out to DSND. Disputes arose with DSND being unwilling to engage in installation work until other related matters concerned with insurance should something go wrong were concluded. That refusal to do the installation, while a breach of contract, was not deemed by Dyson J to be illegitimate,​[97]​ but the precedential value of the case is lessened by two factors. It was at first instance, but more importantly it was obiter as Dyson J also held there were reasonable alternatives open to PGS.​[98]​ In other cases where there is a threatened breach of contract there has usually been liability.​[99]​ For Spark, there may genuinely be cases where the contractor cannot perform, but where frustration is unavailable.​[100]​ Halson has argued in the same vein that in cases of threats to break a contract are legitimate if the variation is reasonably related to the cost consequences to the performing party.​[101]​ Both Spark’s and Halson’s point seem to confuse two different elements of duress. As a threat to break a contract always involves a threat to disregard the complainant’s rights, it should always be seen as illegitimate. If not, contractual rights appear of lesser importance.

Where there is no threat to breach the claimant’s rights, there might be, as in Smith v Charlick,​[102]​ a threat not to contract with the claimant in the future, which may be unproblematic. ​[103]​ In Smith v Charlick itself the Australian Wheat Wharvest Board threatened to cut off supplies of flour to a miller. The refusal to supply was not a breach of any existing contract. The demand made was for the payment of additional surcharges to which the board was not entitled. The High Court of Australia said that the surcharge could not be recovered because refusing to deal is not per se economic duress. It is also often asserted that mere commercial pressure will not suffice,​[104]​ but it is vague as to what this means, and few cases have been successful.​[105]​ In Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd v Royscot Trust​[106]​ the claimants went into administrative receivership; the receivers wanted to sell the business as a going concern. However, to do so they were forced to pay £82,000 to the defendants who had threatened to terminate the hire purchase agreements and repossess a number of vehicles. Their threat to do so was not illegitimate as there was nothing amounting to unconscionable behaviour,​[107]​ although the judge did not elaborate on what might amount to unconscionability.

 Bigwood argues correctly that the key is whether the defendant’s rights are used for a proper purpose,.​[108]​ and we have seen that AG v R decides that the nature of the demand supported by the threat is an important aspect of illegitimacy. The soldier signed a confidentiality agreement under threat of being returned to unit (RTU in military jargon). For a serving SAS member, as he was, this was usually considered to be a punishment. The Privy Council held the Ministry of Defence could legitimately believe someone who refused to sign was unsuitable for the SAS and so the threat of RTU was justified. There was no duress. Take blackmail as well, which is Bigwood’s example. A party is at liberty to report another to the police, but that liberty cannot be used to extract money; it is not what the liberty is for. It is, he argues, wrongful to assert our strict legal rights to secure advantages with which those rights have no intrinsic connection. While these threats may be 'lawful' strictly speaking, they are nonetheless exploitative.​[109]​ 


(II)	Choice Prong: Impairment of Consent

We saw earlier in the context of undue influence that there is talk of overbearing the will – this idea of the overborne will,  (or compulsion of the will as it is described in AG v R,) is also found in the duress cases​[110]​ as is the idea of vitiation of consent.​[111]​ Even under the most extreme duress, however, the claimant intends to do as he does so the language is not entirely apposite. In Haines v Carter therefore William Young J said that there did not have to be a complete absence of free will.​[112]​ Rather what is important is the absence of practical choice, also referred to in AG v R. If the law finds that the complainant had a reasonable alternative open to him, he cannot really complain if there is no relief and chooses not to avail himself of it.​[113]​ Other discriminators such as a requirement to protest​[114]​ or bad faith​[115]​ have also been canvassed, but should not be required. One does not need to protest to have no choice, and one does not need to be in bad faith to coerce. Just as in the other vitiating factors a decision must be taken whether duress is concerned with impairment of the consent of the complainant. For Spark it is a question of impairment of consent,​[116]​ not wrongdoing or absence of intent as indicated by an overborne will. Spark justifies this in part by noting that the effect of duress is to render the contract voidable. What this means is that there is some consent, just consent we deem ineffective. 

2.	Intentional Action and Practical Reasoning 

We have seen how the two causes of action work and how each depends on the acts of the defendant in changing the way we make a decision. This section aims to show how that is reflected analytically in the exercise of our agency. As we saw earlier in the introduction the paper accepts a justification of these claims in terms of autonomy and infringement of our autonomy. Defendant-sided unjust factors reflect the fact that autonomy and sociality go together. Being autonomous is a skill we acquire and exercise only in social environments where we can trust other people to support it.​[117]​ We explore the way in which this social interactivity is reflected in a particular agent’s planning and end-setting. This is important. Michael Bratman’s theory is based on a view of ourselves as planning agents. We plan what we want and intend to do and we do so on the basis of our stable valuings about what is important to us as individuals. I plan to revise this paper for publication on the basis of a stable view that research is important and worthwhile for example, and I set as an end having a good publishable article. 









We are used in the philosophy of action to drawing a distinction between two different kinds of action; actions that are governed or directed by the agent – things she does - and are therefore truly attributable to her and those that merely happen to her.​[119]​ It is sometimes said that a policy that has agential authority, when it causes an action, speaks for the agent. The policy must “speak for the agent” when we want to say that the agent directs and governs the action and so must be what Bratman refers to as a self-governing policy. This is jargon; the critical thing is that we have desires about our actions, but also the capacity to step back and reflect on whether to act on them. It is those higher order self-governing policies which say which desires we treat in our deliberation as justifying reasons for action,​[120]​ and which play a role in our practical reasoning as to what to do next and why. For example I might desire a cigarette, but critically reflect that I ought for health reasons to give up. That policy to improve my health has agential authority because it directs and governs my decision to give up smoking. Importantly Bratman has distinguished two ideas, saying agential direction and governance are different things.​[121]​ In agential direction there is sufficient unity and organisation of motives that they function as directing the agent (ie he or she acts), but agential governance is direction appropriately involving the agent’s treating certain considerations as justifying reasons for action. As we see later in this essay it is agential governance that is affected by the defendant’s action. There is sufficient unity and organisation to my motives (to carry on living) to say that it is I who am acting when I hand over money at gunpoint. I make a rational choice on the basis of the circumstances. 





Agential authority is related to the separate question of subjective normative authority, which Bratman describes as concerning the relationship between desiring something and treating it as of motivational importance.​[126]​ As Bratman also points out, the two accounts need to be co-ordinated as we are agents whose actions are subject to normative deliberation in that we engage in reasoning about what we should do.​[127]​ Higher order policies are vital here too therefore. The higher order policy must concern which desired ends to treat as important in our decision-making process.​[128]​ For Bratman a desire for X leads to an intention in favour of a means to X and because of X as a justifying end. However, by appealing to an idea of the agent’s treating something as justifying do we simply beg the question – why does the agent treat it as such and bring us back to our original question? 







Practical reasoning is simply reasoning as to what to do, as opposed to theoretical reasoning which is reasoning as to what we know. As Chen-Wishart has pointed out, I am not responsible for my transactional parties. Indeed to make me responsible for my transactional parties’ practical reasoning would seem to disrespect them as autonomous rational beings pursuing their own norms. This is because we would implicitly be saying that the other party cannot be trusted to make decisions about what to do. Respecting the other party as an autonomous self-legislating agent is at the heart of the relief we provide for mistake,​[131]​ and we need to be consistent with that rationale in explaining or modelling the defendant-sided factors. This is why the defendant must be responsible for causing the problem, or potential problem. 

As Bigwood points out, and as we have been discussing throughout, there are (at least) two forms of influence which are recognised as responsibility-relieving in law.​[132]​ Coercive influences are one, and influence by a specially trusted party another. Although, as Bigwood properly points out, they operate differently, the impact we argue here is in both cases that the complainant acts under or “in the grip of a norm.” This idea of the grip of a norm is an idea Bratman introduces in the context of subjective normative authority, although he himself got the idea from the work of Allan Gibbard. Bratman explains the way in which “the grip of a norm” functions in the context of subjective normative authority like this. The desire for X and the thought of X as justifying plays a role in the motivational efficacy of X even though the agent does not fully endorse that functioning.​[133]​ It may seem strange, or even contradictory, to say that the desire is treated as justifying the agent’s action and therefore as a reason for action if the agent does not endorse its functioning as a reason. That almost sounds like the agent treats it as a reason, but not really. In fact what is going on is that the agent’s reasoning is attenuated in that he does not take all the appropriate factors into account. Bratman concludes that a desire for X functions as end-setting for practical reasoning when the desire is treated as justifying in the particular context, but a desire may function in that way despite the absence of a higher order attitude, which has agential authority, operating in its favour.​[134]​ This may be a little too simple for our purposes as we will see below, but for now let us accept it. 





(I)	Duress and “Acting in the Grip of a Norm” 

We have alluded to rational control theory already when discussing agential authority. A rational control theorist believes that if you are able to make rational choices controlling your actions you are free. An unsophisticated version of such a theory might simply be that when you put a gun to my head I make a rational choice between life and death and therefore freedom as rational control is maintained.​[135]​ For Leon this does not suffice. He argues a rational control thesis requires rationality not only at the point of choice, but at the point of formation of the agent’s beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires, he argues, need to be formed in a truth- or evidence- or reason- sensitive manner. ​[136]​ For Leon, in the case of coercion or duress the agent’s desires are formed in the wrong sort of way to count as autonomously formed. They are formed in a way that is caused by the coercer’s desires rather than the agent’s own standards, reasons and values.​[137]​ 

In doctrinal terms a link has sometimes been made in duress between consent and causation. McKendrick suggests for example that lack of consent is relevant to establish the sufficiency of the causal link,​[138]​ but this is not uncontroversial. Causation and consent are, according to some, different questions.​[139]​ Bigwood for example argues that there are two aspects to this. There is the unproblematic empirical aspect. Did the threat in point of fact cause or induce the claimant to manifest his consent? The second is whether or not the claimant was justified in manifesting consent in response to the pressure. Bigwood argues that it is a common feature of the debate to conflate the two, or at least to highlight the empirical first aspect over the normative second aspect. If we examine the first aspect we can say that but-for the coercion the agent would have had no desire and formed no intention to enter the transaction. This is what Leon means when he says that the decision to enter the transaction bears the wrong counter-factual relationship to the desire to evade the threatened action.​[140]​ But-for the threat the agent would not have entered into the transaction. The wrong counter-factual is entering the transaction versus the threat’s being enacted. The correct counter-factual is entering the transaction versus the consequences and opportunity cost of not doing so where there were no threat. The correct way to form the intention to enter the transaction is on the basis of reasons that make it a good transaction. The desire to evade the threat is instrumental; it does not explain why – if at all – the transaction’s terms are good ones for the claimant. Leon therefore seems to conflate Bigwood’s two aspects. We still, however, need to assess, as a normative matter, what would count as appropriate reasons for the claimant to make the choice in favour of the transaction. Once the threat is deemed not to be an appropriate reason for the choice, so that in doctrinal terms it counts as illegitimate, it is not made in an appropriately reason-sensitive manner. 

There is something to the unsophisticated argument despite this. Agential authority is a combination of agential governance and direction. Pallikkathayil picks up on something similar to argue that a pure impaired action theory of coercion (and by extension probably undue influence) will not work.​[141]​ We should not treat the agent’s choice as somehow not a “proper” action; for Pallikatthayil it is still “full-blown” agency. A bad choice is still a choice; the agent assesses the circumstances and chooses to act. There is – as we saw earlier - agential direction. 






To explain, for Gibbard, when we work out what to do in a particular case in community with others we engage in what he calls normative discussion. We engage in this type of normative discussion because shared evaluation and normative governance aids in our setting ends for ourselves – ends consistent with those of others with whom we must interact in our complex social life. Engaging with others influences how we act in given situations; it is normatively governing.​[145]​ Our decisions about what to do in those situations are socially influenced. Essentially we are unable – in many situations - to achieve our own ends without some co-operation from others. Those other people need to be persuaded to help or at least not actively obstruct and this may involve some negotiation and co-operation. This fits with our current context as the defendant-sided factors depend on a social context, a point made by Chen-Wishart in the context of undue influence and accepted in this paper. Governance by the norm, Gibbard says, is our tendency to conform to it and acceptance of the norm is whatever psychic state leads to its being part of our normative governance.​[146]​ 

The distinction with internalising a norm is that the latter works independently of true normative discussion, looking at the real reasons for and against a course of conduct. Hurting another (to adapt the Milgram experiment example) may be acceptable if you find them threatening a child, because protecting the vulnerable from greater harm justifies (the minimum necessary amount of) violence towards the other person. True acceptance of the norm requires such true normative discussion, and consideration of the pros and cons. It seems at least plausible though that we have internalised or acted in the grip of a norm that we should act in a given way when that norm was improperly inveigled upon us by the other party. The defendant may, in a duress claim, have illegitimately structured our choices in a particular way.​[147]​ There has been no agential governance, because there has been no appropriate recognition of reasons as justifying in the context of the relevant higher order norms of the agent, and so the claimant does not act in accordance with those rationally chosen higher order norms. There has, however, been agential direction and subjective normative authority. Since for Bratman autonomous action implies agential governance as well as direction, the agent is not truly acting autonomously although the actions are his and not merely things that happen.

That illegitimate structuring of our choices is what distinguishes duress cases from cases of normal or natural constraints on our action. There are very few lawful act duress cases but AG v R​[148]​ may provide a vehicle for discussion. The soldier signed a confidentiality agreement under threat of being returned to unit (RTU in military jargon). For a serving SAS member, as he was, this was usually considered to be a punishment. The Privy Council held, applying The Universe Sentinel, the threat was a legitimate one as the Ministry of Defence had perfectly proper concerns. The Ministry was not engaged in improperly influencing the end-setting mechanisms of the soldier because it could reasonably take the view that one unwilling to sign the contract was unfit for the SAS and so the threat of RTU was justified in the circumstances. There was no duress. 
In fact there was, as we have seen, no illegitimate threat here. However, 
fFor Bigwood illegitimacy, as we have seen, depends on there being a threatened breach of a right or . It might also encompass the threatened use of rights for improper purposes.​[149]​ Had the MoD’s threatt, however, been illegitimate as used for an improper purpose the soldier’s choice would have been at issue and if there were no practical or reasonable alternatives the decision would not have been made in a reason-sensitive manner in Leon’s terms. Nor would it have been properly accepted in Gibbard’s. The desire to sign would function as end-setting for practical reasoning even though the agent did not appropriately endorse it. We saw earlier that Bratman suggested there would be no higher-order attitude in its favour. Yet in some circumstances we might want to argue there is such a higher order attitude. In Barton v Armstrong​[150]​ the higher order policy in play was to avoid physical injury. In our modified AG v R it is to remain in the SAS. In Bratman’s language this is, however, an instrumental policy. What we need in order to say that there is agential governance as well as agential direction is a non-instrumental policy, so the desire is not seen as a causal means to a further end – avoiding RTU or death or injury at the hands of a Yugoslav hitman - distinct from the desire itself.​[151]​ This – and it is worth stressing the point - ties back to the point we made when discussing Leon. There is the wrong counter-factual. The reason (an instrumental policy to avoid injury) is the, normatively speaking, wrong reason, and so the threat is illegitimate.  









(II)	Undue Influence and “Acting in the Grip of a Norm”

Undue influence can be described in similar terms. Chen-Wishart, as we saw, argues that a relational approach to undue influence is required. For her we are persons with attachments; we commit ourselves to others, projects and relationships. Society itself provides us with the options from which we can choose, and the space in which we can flourish.​[156]​ This sits easily within the normative discourse conception of Gibbard.​[157]​ Bigwood argues that the undue influencer’s conduct resides in an exploitative use of a special trust relationship rather than any proposed rights-violation by the coercer.​[158]​ Although as human beings our reasons for action often begin externally, unless they are fully and genuinely internalised as our own there is a risk of our mind being used as a mere channel through which the will of another operates.​[159]​ For Chen-Wishart therefore undue influence can be understood as a response to harm to the autonomy enhancing form of relationships.​[160]​ 


In Allcard v Skinner the nun gave up all her worldly wealth at the request of the mother superior in circumstances where the mother superior was to be treated as the voice of God and where she was forbidden to seek outside advice. In Allcard Cotton LJ professed doubt as to the propriety of the absolute submission required.​[161]​ For Lindley LJ that coupled with the rule denying external advice “is so oppressive and so easily abused” that the nun required protection.​[162]​ This can be seen in terms of acting “in the grip of a norm” in precisely the same terms as the Milgram experiments. The Court of Appeal took the view that the nun did not accept the norm of poverty, but acted in its grip; her reasoning was “Well this is what the Mother Superior wants.” We should note, however, at this point that because she had waited too long and had effectively acquiesced in the continued gift she did not actually recover the money.​[163]​ There is though a trend in England and Australia to see religious influence as potentially problematic.​[164]​ In Quek v Beggs​[165]​ Quek gave virtually all her assets to the church in New South Wales of which Beggs was pastor. Influence was described in Quek as referring to a psychological ascendancy over the donor – terms reminiscent of the “grip of a norm”. Religious influence is seen as more likely to end in psychological dependency (or acting in the grip of the norm of deference)​[166]​ and therefore more likely to be abused. 


One of the most frequent types of case in undue influence is the case where one party – usually the male partner – gets another family member to sign mortgage or guarantee documentation, and the bank subsequently attempts to enforce that. These cases are in principle no different; the family member who has allegedly been unduly influenced – usually but by no means exclusively the female partner – may have signed the documents to protect the family business or to save the marriage. These motives may look as if they are unrelated to the transaction. That, in and of itself, is not a problem. . What makes the critical a difference and demonstrates that there has been undue influence and that the claimant female partner was in the grip of a norm is whether she (and it usually is the female partner)she (usually it is she) the female partner has gaveiven the matter much (if any) any thought beyond, “This is what he wants.” 

For the sake of completeness we should note undue influence was also raised unsuccessfully in AG v R. The sense that the soldier had received an order might lead to our suggesting he acted in the grip of a norm of obedience in signing the agreement, but not all such cases of obedience are problematic. Were he on patrol in Helmand, obedience would be entirely appropriate, and so the MoD can hardly be said to act improperly in “inveigling a norm of obedience” into the head of the soldier. Indeed one could quite sensibly suggest that the norm of obedience had been truly accepted by the soldier who recognised when he joined the army the importance of the chain of command and the rationale for it.

We are not quite finished in our modelling of these two causes of action. There is an objection that might be made. Could we say that our account of undue influence is missing an important element of agential authority? Policies with agential authority for Bratman acquire their importance because of their role in structuring the agent’s deliberations over time. Yet the idea of the agent’s being satisfied with a policy has a synchronic rather than a diachronic nature.​[167]​ It refers to satisfaction now, something which may not hold into the future. Bratman acknowledges the mutability of these preferences. We saw earlier that it is possible my preferences might change so a career in legal practice suits me better than academia. Our account of undue influence has not taken this element into account yet; perhaps our preferences just change naturally so that we defer to the other party. Bratman might, however, argue that an agent manipulated in some way through undue influence so that the threads linking him to his past selves are broken has had his responsible agency violated.​[168]​ 

This seems to fit reasonably well. Leaving aside that the claimant had waited too long to recover the property, in Allcard v Skinner the claimant was, when she made the gifts, fully committed to life as a nun within the Roman Catholic Church. The policy of obedience to the Mother Superior worked so that she made the gift under a policy of obedience which was justifying by virtue of the policy itself. The law made a judgment that, despite this, the desire was not a “legitimate candidate for satisfaction”​[169]​ as the nun did not work through whether to give the money away by virtue of her prior views and attitudes on charitable giving rather her giving was in the course of the instrumental policy to please the Mother Superior. Just as in the duress cases there has been subjective normative authority and agential direction, but not governance as the reasoning is not appropriately identifying justifying reasons. One can quibble over whether this is plausible on particular facts and whether the distinction between Allcard and my example of the soldier on patrol is a valid one, but the underlying and implicit philosophical thrust of the doctrine seems clear. Quite possibly the distinction between the military and religious contexts is nothing more than a social policy decision. 






The two defendant-sided unjust factors we have looked at seem very different from each other. This paper first outlined the law on duress and undue influence and adopted a rationalisation of the causes of action such that undue influence is based on abuse of, what we called, deferential trust and duress on an illegitimate threat or proposal leading to the claimant’s lack of consent. The paper also distinguished undue influence from the unconscionable bargains doctrine where a different justification applies that does not rely on the abuse of such trust reposed in the defendant. On the basis of that, it demonstrated that there is a common structural core to both duress and undue influence and the effects of the claimant’s agency, although it has assumed rather than proven a theoretical rationale for saying that defects in the claimant’s agency justify relief. In each case the defendant has forced himself in different ways into the complainant’s end-setting. 

In duress this takes place by improperly setting up choice conditions so that the claimant’s intentions are formed in a non-autonomous way rather than being responsive to the normal natural constraints. For Pallikkathayil this is at the heart of her account. The defendant takes control of an option that the complainant is entitled to have.​[174]​ She makes it impossible for agential governance over the complainant’s actions to be possible, although there is both agential direction and subjective normative authority. Undue influence can also be modelled in the way that Pallikkathayil suggests. The defendant by using the parties’ relationship to force her way into the claimant’s decision-making capacity makes it impossible for there to be proper agential governance, although again there is agential direction and subjective normative authority. Rather the claimant defers to the defendant. 
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